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Achieving Victory in the International Trade
Obstacle Course: The 2007 Farm Bill and
Passive Chinese Behavior
Caitlin E. Carr*
I. Introduction
The World Trade Organization (WTO) launched its Doha Round of
trade negotiations following the September 1 1th terrorist attacks on
America with hopes of uniting the international community under the
umbrella of international trade.1 In the past, the WTO has produced
successful trade negotiations with the Kennedy Round (ending in 1967),2
Tokyo Round (ending in 1979), 3 and the Uruguay Round (ending in
1993). 4 However, the world community expected the Doha Round to be
more difficult to negotiate than those in the past.5 Since the previous
Uruguay negotiations, the WTO had greatly increased in size, to 150
nations.6  The addition of the consensus-decision rule compelled all
participants to agree to the outcome of the negotiations.7 Furthermore, as
a result of its increased membership, the WTO added a growing group of
developing countries that had veto power at every stage of the
negotiation process. 8 The increased presence of poorer nations in the
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University, 2008; B.A. Bowling Green State University, 2005. I would like to thank all
of my friends and colleagues who were incredibly supportive and understanding through
the writing process. I would also like to extend a special thank you to my parents, Tim
and Jill Carr, for their constant love and support along the way.
1. See The Future of Globalisation, THE ECONOMIST, July 29, 2006.
2. See MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HowSE, THE REGULATION OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 24 (3d ed. 2005).
3. See id.
4. See id. See also C. Fred Bergsten, Rescuing the Doha Round, FOREIGN AFF.,
Dec. 2005 (WTO Special ed.).
5. See id.
6. World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO: The Organization:
Members and Observers, Jan. 11, 2007, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/
whatis e/tif e/org6_e.htm.
7. See Bergsten, supra note 5.
8. See id.
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WTO made it clear to developed nations like the United States (U.S.) and
those in the European Union (E.U.) that there would be no Doha
agreement unless developing nations stood to gain something from the
agreement. 9 In addition, the Doha negotiators faced the expiration of
President George W. Bush's fast-track Trade Promotion Authority (TPA)
in June 2007.10
This Comment focuses on two major stumbling blocks the Doha
negotiators will have to overcome to reach a successful final agreement.
The first is the potential passage of the 2007 Farm Bill by the U.S.
Congress. This comment will demonstrate that the terms of the Farm
Bill will have a strong effect on the global perceptions of the U.S.'s
commitment to the continued expansion of international trade under
WTO guidelines. The second issue for discussion is China's role in the
Doha negotiation process. China will have to show increased leadership
in the global trading regime in order to conclude the already overdue
culmination of the Doha Round.
II. The Doha Round: Past to Present
The WTO's Doha negotiations began on November 11, 2001, with
the U.S. encouraging the other WTO Member States to participate."
The WTO termed the agenda for the Doha Round as a "development
agenda" comprised of five main commitments. 12 These commitments
included embracing trade liberalization, 13 focusing on developing
countries' needs, 14 assisting developing countries through effective
participation in the international trading system,' 5 working with the
Bretton Woods institutions (International Monetary Fund and World
Bank), 16 and ensuring the effective participation of all WTO Member
States. 7
9. See ROBERT L. THOMPSON, INT'L FOOD & AGRIC. POL'Y COUNCIL, AN IPC ISSUE
BRIEF: THE US FARM BILL AND THE DOHA NEGOTIATIONS: ON PARALLEL TRACKS OR A
COLLISION COURSE? 3 (2005).
10. See Trade Act of 2002, 19 U.S.C. § 3803 (2006) (giving Trade Promotion
Authority to the President allows exclusive and absolute power in negotiating and
concluding trade agreements that will then be presented to Congress for an up or down
vote with no amendments).
11. See Under Attack: World Trade, ECONOMIST, July 8, 2006 [hereinafter Under
Attack].
12. See TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 2, at 498 (stating that trade liberalization
means the rejection of protectionism).
13. See id.
14. See id. (asserting that international trade plays a large role in promoting
economic development and in alleviating poverty).
15. See id. (addressing the marginalization of least-developed countries).
16. See id. (stating that trade solely cannot address the challenges of the rapidly
changing international environment).
17. See TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 2, at 498.
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A. The Emergence of the Agricultural Problem
As the Doha negotiations commenced, market access to agricultural
and industrial goods emerged as the most hotly debated topic.'
8
Agricultural products became a hotbed for discussion because
developing countries wanted developed countries to drop domestic
support of agriculture, improve market access and phase out all forms of
export subsidies. 19 In addition, developing countries lobbied for special
and differential treatment with regard to their own agricultural goods in
an effort to make them more competitive with developed nations. °
Those demands from developing states were made in the spirit of the
Doha agenda, that is, "to level the playing field in international trade
through the use of concessions for these developing nations, most of
which are heavily dependent on agriculture.
' 21
Before attending the Doha Round, the U.S. knew agriculture would
22be the central issue between the negotiating parties. The Bush
Administration, through Robert Zoellick, a former U.S. Trade
Representative, felt confident it could retain a good bargaining position
on the agriculture issue.23 However, many developing countries set out
to prove the U.S. wrong. 4 Developing countries stated that during the
course of Doha negotiations the U.S. should not expect to strong-arm
developing nations into agreement.25 In particular, Ghana noted concern
about the upcoming 2002 Farm Bill being debated in Congress and its
potential to protect American farmers to the detriment of agriculture
production on a global scale.26
1. Two Steps Backwards with the Passage of the 2002 Farm Bill
In May 2002, any upper-hand credibility the U.S. retained with
regard to agricultural subsidies was lost in the eyes of many developing
18. See Under Attack, supra note 12.
19. See TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 2, at 499.
20. See id. (arguing that special and differential treatment is necessary to protect
developing countries' development and food security needs).
21. Marlen V. Ronquillo, Sunday Stories Feckless in Doha, MANILA TIMES, Aug. 27,
2006.
22. See Europe's Meagre Harvest, ECONOMIST, Jan. 25, 2003, at 70.
23. See Daniel Altman, Global Trade Looking Glass: Can US. Have It Both Ways?,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2002, at C1 ("Doha wouldn't have happened if it weren't for the
United States.... The United States has an added responsibility for the trading and
international economic system as a whole.").
24. See id.
25. See id. (stating that Malaysia's minister of international trade and industry had
told the U.S. that, "[n]o one can force anyone to do anything there, least of all the United
States," in response to potential strong-arm tactics).
26. See id.
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countries with Congress's passage of the 2002 Farm Bill. 27  That bill
increased domestic subsidies for American farmers by 80 percent,28
which inflamed the developing world. 29 Developing countries argued
that the subsidies within the 2002 Farm Bill encouraged American
farmers to over-produce, which would cause prices to fall in international
markets.30  The Farm Bill, however, kept the U.S. within the WTO
mandated limit of $19 billion per year in "aggregate measures of
support" (AMS)31 that were negotiated during the preceding Uruguay
Round.32 Still, the Farm Bill greatly increased subsidies on American
soybean, wheat and corn crops.33 The passage of the 2002 Farm Bill was
seen as a signal to developing countries that Congress and the Bush
Administration would strive to protect American farmers at all costs.
34
The Agriculture Minister of Thailand (a developing country) described
the view as:
This is the way of rich countries.... They tell us to open our
markets; we do but they don't stop giving their farmers subsidies.
Now American farmers will be given money to grow cheap rice and
push down the world price for the next six years. That pushes our
poorest farmers out of business.
35
In 2007 a new Farm Bill will be up for debate before Congress and it too
could have drastic consequences for the success of the Doha
negotiations.
36
2. Attempts at a Remedy to the International Backlash
In July 2002, a few months after the passage of the Farm Bill, the
U.S. made an attempt to remedy its relationship with other WTO nations
by putting an ambitious agriculture proposal before the WTO that
attempted to recover some of their lost support from the 2002 Farm Bill
27. See Elizabeth Becker, A New Villain in Free Trade: The Farmer on the Dole,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2002, § 4, at 10.
28. Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, 7 U.S.C. §§ 7901-8106 (2000).
29. See Becker, supra note 28.
30. See id.
31. See TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 2, at 335-36 (explaining that AMS is a
common standard measuring domestic support of each country's agriculture industry).
32. See Dept. of Agriculture Foreign Agriculture Service, U.S. Proposal for Global
Agricultural Trade Reform, available at http://www.fas.usda.gov/itp/wto/proposal.htm
(last visited June 3, 2007) (noting that the U.S.'s AMS ceiling is far below that of Europe
or Japan, who have ceilings at $60 billion per year and $30 billion per year respectively)
[hereinafter U.S. Proposal].
33. See Aligning U.S. Farm Policy with World Trade Commitments, AGRIC.
OUTLOOK, Jan.-Feb. 2002, at 12.
34. See Becker, supra note 28.
35. Id.
36. See THOMPSON, supra note 10.
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enactment.37  That new proposal called for a large reduction in
agricultural tariffs around the world,38 complete elimination of export
subsidies39 and reductions in domestic subsidies to farmers. 40 The E.U.
and Japan, all having farmer-protectionist policies, criticized the U.S.
proposal. 41 These nations use high tariffs and provide large amounts of
domestic subsidies to agricultural products. 42 Furthermore, both the E.U.
and Japan noted that the U.S. proposal put much of the international
trade reform burden on them, while having little internal effect in the
U.S. 43 Over the next year, the E.U. and the U.S. negotiated over the U.S.
proposal and eventually came to an agreement on how to jointly
approach the agriculture dilemma.44 This combined effort called for the
U.S. and the E.U. to reduce protections for their farmers and also called
for some subsidies, such as those designed to improve environmental
standards on farms, to be placed in a separate category that was not
considered protectionist.45 The joint effort between the U.S. and the E.U.
culminated in September 2003 when all WTO Member States came
together in Cancun, Mexico for a Ministerial Meeting where the U.S. and
the E.U. made their negotiated agreement public.46
B. The First Stalemate: The Cancun Ministerial Meeting
As a result of the joint U.S./E.U. announcement of their agreement
on agriculture, approximately twenty developing countries walked out of
the Cancun talks.47 Brazil and India, two emerging agricultural powers
and leaders of the G-20,48 led the coalition of developing nations in the
37. See US. Proposal, supra note 33.
38. See id. (proposing the use if a harmonizing formula for reducing all agricultural
tariffs so that no individual tariff exceeds 25 percent after the five year phase-in period).
39. See id. (noting that these reductions would be phased in over a five year time
period in equal increments).
40. See id. (proposing the use of a formula to limit all domestic support for every
country to five percent of all agricultural production).
41. See WTO Chair Cites Good Progress in Farm Trade Talks, BUREAU NAT'L AFF.
TRADE DAILY, Nov. 12, 2002.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See Paul Meller, Framework Set For Reduction Of Subsidies, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
14, 2003, at C1.
45. See id.
46. See Elizabeth Becker, Delegates from Poorer Nations Walk Out of World Trade
Talks, N.Y. TiMES, Sept. 15, 2003, at Al.
47. See id.
48. See THOMPSON, supra note 10 (noting that the G-20 is comprised of Brazil,
Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, China, Cuba, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria,
Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, South Africa, Tanzania, Thailand, Venezuela, and
Zimbabwe); see also Members, G-20, http://www.g-20.mre.gov.br/members.asp (last
visited June 3, 2007) (adding that Uruguay and Guatemala are also members).
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walkout.49 The G-20 was established immediately prior to the talks in
Cancun in an effort to enforce the Doha mandate for development in
developing countries.5 ° The developing countries that left Cancun after
the announcement of the U.S./E.U. compromise attributed their
abandonment of the talks to the "less aggressive stance the United States
seemed to take in regards to its earlier WTO agriculture proposal.,
51
Through its agreement, the U.S. made significant compromises with
the E.U. to protect the Common Agricultural Policy of the E.U.,52 which
53provided huge subsidies to European farmers. Subsequently, in an
attempt to remedy the stalemate with developing countries Congress
passed legislation regarding the 2006 federal budget, which proposed to
cut spending on agricultural subsidies by $3 billion over a period of five
years.54 Such agricultural subsidies for farmers in developed countries,
like those in the E.U., have been what developing countries have been
fighting all along.
While the 2003 Cancun Ministerial Meeting was a failure due to the
negotiation collapse,55 the main Doha negotiations in Geneva kept going.
However, due to the Cancun delay, the original deadline for the Doha
round expired on January 1, 2005.56
C. Recent Developments in the Doha Negotiation Process
1. Proposition by the United States Trade Representative
In July 2006, Susan Schwab, President George W. Bush's newly-
appointed U.S. Trade Representative," declared that the U.S. was
49. See Becker, supra note 47.
50. See History, G-20, http://www.g-20.mre.gov.br/history.asp (last visited June 3,
2007).
51. US., EU Offer Ag Negotiating Framework, WASH. TRADE DAILY, Aug. 14,
2003, at 1.
52. See CAP Leaflet: The Common Agricultural Policy-A Policy Evolving with the
Times, EUROPA, available at http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/publi/capleaflet/cap-en.htm
(stating that the CAP was created to ensure that the E.U. had a sustainable agricultural
sector and to ensure a food supply for Europeans) (last visited June 3, 2007).
53. See id.
54. See AMERICAN FARM BUREAU, Congress Cuts $3 Billion in Agriculture
Spending, May 2, 2005, available at http://www.fb.org/newsroom/fbn/2005/FBN_05-02-
05.pdf (last visited June 3, 2007).
55. See Becker, supra note 47.
56. See WTO, Ministerial Declaration of the Doha 4th Ministerial-Ministerial
Declaration, Nov. 14, 2001, available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/minist_e/
min0l_e/mindecle.htm (last visited June 3, 2007).
57. See Ambassador Susan Schwab, United States Trade Representative, June 9,
2006, http://www.ustr.gov/Who-WeAre/Bios/AmbassadorSusanCSchwab.html
(explaining that Schwab was nominated by President Bush on April 18, 2006 and
confirmed by the U.S. Senate on June 8, 2006 as the U.S. Trade Representative).
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finished cutting subsidies to its farmers, as Congress had done with the
federal budget proposal in April 2005.58 Specifically, Schwab criticized
the E.U. for its resistance to cutting domestic subsidies and tariffs.
59
According to the Office of the Trade Representative, "[t]he United States
has put forth the world's most ambitious proposal for removing trade-
distorting barriers to trade in agriculture. 60  Through her remarks,
Schwab made it clear that the U.S. wanted rich nations to cut their
barriers to trade by approximately sixty-six percent;6 1 meanwhile, the
E.U. was only willing to cut thirty-nine percent.62 Similarly, the G-20
group (including Brazil, India, and China) requested a fifty-four percent
cut by rich nations,63 while they pushed for developing nations to only
cut two-thirds of that amount with special loopholes designed to protect
the livelihood of their farmers.
64
2. Proposition by the WTO Director-General
At the same time, the Director-General of the WTO, Pascal Lamy,
proposed a "20/20/20" deal65 that was also encouraged by World Bank
President Paul Wolfowitz. 66 Lamy's proposal required the U.S. to cut its
67 dteIT
subsidy levels below $20 billion per year, required the E.U. to accept
the G20's proposal regarding farm tariffs,68 and required emerging G-20
69
economies to cap their industrial tariffs at twenty percent.
Unfortunately, the two leaders of the G-20 group, Brazil and India, did
not agree on Lamy's "20/20/20" proposal.70 India maintained that the
Doha Round was intended to help poorer nations, meaning that
developing nations should not be required to change any of their trade
policies.7 ' India therefore rejected Lamy's proposition.72
58. See Under Attack, supra note 12.
59. See id.
60. OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, U.S. LEADERSHIP ON
HELPING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES REALIZE BENEFITS OF DOHA ROUND 1 (2005).
61. Under Attack, supra note 12.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See id.
65. Id.
66. See Doha Round: Can St. Petersburg Summit Yield A Breakthrough, Bridges
Wkly. Trade News Dig., July 12, 2006, http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/06-07-12/
storyl .htm.
67. See Under Attack, supra note 12.
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See Under Attack, supra note 12.
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3. The Second Stalemate
Ultimately, a stalemate developed between WTO Member States
over the competing proposals.73 Faced with the lack of progress by
various negotiators, 74 Director-General Lamy suspended the talks on July
28, 2006.75 Lamy further stated that he would not suggest any dates in
the future for resumption of the negotiations as it was not possible at the
time.76 Just as in Cancun in 2003, it became apparent that the talks had
collapsed due to the international debate over agriculture. In suspending
the talks, Lamy expressed hope that WTO Member States would have
the opportunity for "[s]erious reflection by participants which was
clearly necessary. 77
4. The U.S. Identifies a Possible Solution
In September 2006, the U.S. began to push for the talks to resume,
with one caveat. The U.S. publicly identified China as a key player in
the successful negotiation of the Doha Round.78 U.S. Treasury Secretary
Henry Paulson 79 personally visited China in order to encourage China's
revival of the Doha talks.80 Additionally, Director-General Lamy made a
similar visit in September 2006 to urge the participation of Chinese
leadership in reinstituting the talks.8'
During his visit to China, Lamy noted that China played a unique
role in the global trading system.82 China is the fastest-growing trading
nation in the world83 and is the world's third largest trading economy.84
73. See WTO General Council Summary: General Council supports suspension of
trade talks, Task Force submits "Aid for Trade" recommendations, July 27-28, 2006,
http://www.wto.org/English/news-e/news06 
-e/gc_.27july06_e.htm (last visited June 3,
2007) [hereinafter General Council Summary].
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See WTO "It's time for serious thinking on What's at Stake Here "-Lamy ", July
27-28, 2006, http://www.wto.org/English/news-e/news06-e/tncchair-report_
27julyO6_e.htm (last visited June 3, 2007).
77. General Council Summary, supra note 74.
78. See Christopher Bodeen, U.S. Treasury Chief Paulson Visits China Amid
Friction Over Trade Imbalance, Ass. PRESS, Sept. 19, 2006.
79. See Dept. of the Treasury, Biography of Henry M. Paulson, Jr., Secretary of the
Treasury, July 27, 2006, http://www.ustreas.gov/organization/bios/paulson-e.html (last
visited June 3, 2007) (noting that Paulson was nominated by President Bush on June 19,
2006 and was confirmed by the U.S. Senate on June 28, 2006).
80. See Bodeen, supra note 79.
81. See Pascal Lamy, Director-General WTO, China in the Multilateral Trading
System: Its Role and Implication (Sept. 6, 2006), available at http://www.wto.org/
english/news-e/spple/spp33_e.htm (last visited June 3, 2007).
82. See generally id.
83. See id.
84. See id.
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By 2050, China's economy is expected to be larger than the economy of
the U.S. 85 The WTO and the U.S. have both made attempts to bring
China to the forefront in getting the Doha talks back on track.86 In doing
so, the U.S. and the WTO highlighted the benefits China stands to gain
with successful Doha negotiations.8 7 Most importantly, as the world's
most populous nation, China will continually need to ensure an adequate
food supply for its people.88 The Doha negotiations would ensure that
China maintains this food supply at stable and affordable prices.89 At the
same time, the Doha Round presents an opportunity for China to
negotiate for special protections for a number of sensitive agricultural
products.90  This would ensure that the Chinese trade balance in
agriculture would not be shocked by a newly negotiated global trade
regime.91
III. The 2007 Farm Bill: The First Step in Showing Commitment to the
Successful Completion of the Doha Round
Currently, the passage of the 2007 Farm Bill and the anticipated
further Doha Round negotiations are proceeding on relatively concurrent
timetables. 92 The 2007 Farm Bill would take effect beginning with the
2008 crop year. 93 Many U.S. farmers are looking to the 2007 Farm Bill
for significant change, with or without the Doha Round of negotiations
as a guideline for Congress to follow. 94  Closer examination of the
expected proposals for the 2007 Farm Bill will predict how the Doha
negotiations might be handled in the future.
85. See GOLDMAN SACHS, GLOBAL ECONOMICS PAPER No. 99: DREAMING WITH
BRICs: THE PATH TO 2050 4 (2003).
86. See Lamy, supra note 82.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. See id; see also U.N. FOOD & AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION, SYMPOSIUM ON
AGRICULTURE, TRADE AND FOOD SECURITY, PAPER No.4 27 (1999) (explaining that a
special agricultural product is characterized as a food staple necessary to a nation's food
supply).
91. See id.
92. See THOMPSON, supra note 10, at 15 (discussing that writing of the 2007 Farm
Bill will occur in early 2007 and the most likely time for conclusion of the Doha Round
is June 2007).
93. See William C. Bridgforth, Twenty-Sixth Annual American Agricultural Law
Association Agricultural Law Symposium & Meeting: American Agricultural Law
Association Presidential Address, 11 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 1, 2 (2006).
94. See AgDay Daily Recap - 09/05/06, Agweb, available at www.lexis.com, search
for "AgDay Daily Recap-09/05/06 AgWeb.com September 5, 2006" (last visited June 3,
2007).
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A. The Current Farm Bill and Political Influence by American
Farmers
The most common argument for agricultural subsidies within the
U.S. has been to support the family farm in order to subsidize its
relatively low-income level.95 However, most of the "typical" small
American family farms are not commercial enterprises capable of
supporting a family.96 These farmers earn the median family income
from non-agricultural sources, and actually lose money in the operation
of their farms.97 At the same time, large agri-business corporations are
not benefiting from subsidy programs. 98 Agri-business accounts for less
than ten percent of farm output in the United States. 99 Furthermore, only
certain crops ("program commodities") qualify to receive subsidy
benefits.100 These crops include: corn, soybeans, wheat, cotton, rice, and
dairy.10 1 In fact, only 150,000 farmers produce seventy-five percent of
the nation's food and fiber produce. 10 2 The lopsided system created by
the 2002 Farm Bill allows seventy percent of government-supported
payments to go to only ten percent of producers.' 0 3 The effect of this,
according to Senator Chuck Hagel of Nebraska is, "[t]hey keep
commodity prices low, drive up land prices, and allow large land owners
to buy up small agricultural producers with taxpayer dollars."'1 4 Even
though it appears that the small farming industry may be on the decline,
farmers have gained political clout with Congress in recent years. 10 5 This
was accomplished by building solidarity among different farmers from a
variety of farming backgrounds. 1
06
Politically, rural America supported the reelection of President
George W. Bush in 2004.107 Agricultural contributions to Political
95. See THOMPSON, supra note 10, at 7.
96. See id. at 8.
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. See ROBERT L. THOMPSON, INT'L FOOD & AGRIC. POL'Y COUNCIL, AN IPC ISSUE
BRIEF: THE US FARM BILL AND THE DOHA NEGOTIATIONS: ON PARALLEL TRACKS OR A
COLLISION COURSE? 7 (2005).
101. See id.
102. See Ron Smith, Former Congressman: Divisive politics stalling progress, Sw.
FARM PRESS, Sept. 21, 2006, at 1.
103. See Farm Bill Field Hearing Opening Statement: Senator Chuck Hagel, STATES
NEWS SERVICE, Aug. 16, 2006 [hereinafter Field Hearing].
104. Id.
105. See THOMPSON, supra note 10, at 8.
106. See id. at 8-9 (explaining, for example, dairy and tobacco farmers formed a
coalition and secured benefits for both that each could not have received on their own).
107. See id. at 9.
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Action Committees during the 2004 election equaled $12.3 million.108
Agricultural interest groups were cited as being among the best in
managing their campaign contributions giving them influence in excess
of their numbers.10 9
B. Political Influence of the American Farmer and the Need for
International Cooperation
Various policy groups within Washington are encouraging Congress
to bear in mind international trade concerns when drafting the 2007 Farm
Bill. The President of the American Agricultural Law Association stated
that his two main recommendations for the 2007 Farm Bill were
international in scope. 110 He outlined his two major goals as, "1) to
expand trade; and 2) to ensure that any changes in farm legislation must
be accompanied by a more level playing field with other countries." '
Many farmers and their lobbying associations recognize the
importance of the Doha Round of WTO negotiations for American
farmers. 112 Most importantly, American farmers want to be included in
the governmental process of negotiating a fair trade agreement. 3
International trade plays a central role in the American agricultural
industry. The future economic viability of produce from American farms
lies in access to international markets.' 1 4 At the same time, American
farmers recognize that the U.S. trade negotiators present at the Doha
talks should not allow the dismantling of American farm support
programs. 115  If a 2007 Farm Bill agreement is not reached within
Congress, many farmers fear an extension of the 2002 Farm Bill.'
16
108. See id. at 10.
109. See id.
110. See Bridgforth, supra note 94, at 3.
111. Id.
112. See Smith, supra note 103 ("[F]ailure of the DOHA Round of WTO negotiations
is bad for agriculture.").
113. See id.
114. See Field Hearing, supra note 104.
115. See Testimony Regarding the Agricultural Negotiations of the World Trade
Organization's "Doha Development Round": Before the H. Agriculture Comm., 109th
Cong. (2006) (statements of Mike Johanns, U.S. Secretary of Agriculture and Rob
Portman, U.S. Trade Representative); Federal Farm Policy: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Livestock and Horticulture of the H. Agriculture Comm., 109th Cong.
(2006) (statement of Billy Thiel, Corn Farmer, Malta Bend, MO) ("As important as
additional market access is, we must make sure that the farm safety net remains in place
for American farmers.").
116. See Smith, supra note 103.
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C. Judicial Influence on the 2007 Farm Bill: United States-Upland
Cotton ("The Cotton Case")
One of the major ways the Doha negotiations may affect the 2007
Farm Bill is through Brazil's action against the U.S. cotton industry
through the WTO Dispute Settlement Body."17 In February 2003, Brazil
filed allegations that the U.S. cotton program violated the Uruguay
Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA). 18  The wealthy Brazilian
Agriculture Minister, Roberto Rodrigues, who was deeply tied to large
agribusiness, led Brazil's fight against the U.S. 1 9
1. Brazil's Allegations
Specifically, Brazil alleged that government subsidies to U.S. cotton
producers increased domestic cotton production and these additional
exports caused the global prices on cotton to fall. 20 Brazil had to meet a
standard of showing "serious prejudice" against Brazilian cotton in the
global marketplace. 121 The concept of "serious prejudice" is defined as
"in any case where ... the effect of the subsidy ... is significant price
suppression, price depression or lost sales in the same market."'122 Brazil
is the second highest global producer of cotton behind the U.S. 23 Brazil
asserted that U.S. actions therefore reduced the earning of Brazilian
cotton farmers who earn their entire income from the marketplace in
cotton. 124  Brazil estimated that it lost approximately $480 million in
cotton revenue due to U.S. subsidy policies. 125 Brazil sought sanctions of
$1.04 billion per year against U.S. goods for these alleged violations. 26
Other countries, such as Australia, supported Brazil's allegations that the
117. See THOMPSON, supra note 10, at 12.
118. See Appellate Body Report, U.S.-Upland Cotton, 1, WT/DS267/AB/R (Mar. 3,
2005) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report]; see also THOMPSON, supra note 10
(explaining that the U.S. was not only a signatory to the URAA, but also a principal
author).
119. See Natuza Nery & Andrew Hay, The Farmer Behind Brazil's Big Farm Fight,
Truth About Trade and Technology, Sept. 26, 2004, available at
http://www.truthabouttrade.org/article.asp?id=2544.
120. See Appellate Body Report, supra note 119, at 83.
121. See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, art. 3.1, 3.2, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A,
Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
122. Appellate Body Report, supra note 119, at 507.
123. See Brazil Asks Trade Group to OK Sanctions on U.S., LA TIMES, Oct. 7, 2005,
at C4 [hereinafter Sanctions].
124. See THOMPSON, supra note 10, at 12.
125. See Mariana Mazza, Brazil Wins Dispute at World Trade Organization Against
US Subsidizing of Cotton, INVESTNEwS BRAZ., Mar. 3, 2005.
126. See Sanctions, supra note 124.
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U.S. cotton subsidies distorted global cotton prices. 127 In its support of
Brazil, Australia alleged that the average Australian cotton farmer lost
$42,000 per year as a result of the U.S. subsidies. 1
28
2. Rebuttal Arguments by the United States
To counter Brazil's arguments, the U.S. argued that its payments to
cotton farmers did not distort trade. 129 The U.S. claimed the payments
were not tied to current production; instead, farmers were paid according
to the acreage he or she planted and according to past production
levels. 130  Therefore, the U.S. argued that the subsidies did not inflate
supply or depress prices in the world marketplace.
131
3. The WTO Rulings
The WTO Panel ruled against the U.S. and mandated that the cotton
subsidy payments be stopped because the payments constituted export
subsidies that offended the URAA. 32  On appeal, the Appellate Body
rendered the first ever WTO decision that found a Member State's
subsidy program to be prohibited.133 In its final decision, the Appellate
Body upheld most of the Panel's initial findings. 134 The Appellate Body
held that both types of subsidies used by the U.S., user-marketing
payments ("Step 2 payments") 135 and export credit guarantees, were
prohibited under the guidelines of WTO membership in the URAA.
136
4. Response to the WTO Appellate Body Ruling
The U.S. Department of Agriculture did what it could to stop the
127. See Cotton Growers Back U.S. Subsidies Ruling, AUSTRL. BROADCASTING CORP.,
Mar. 7, 2005.
128. See id.
129. See Panel Report, U.S.-Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R (Sept. 8, 2004).
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See Appellate Body Report, supra note 119 at 288 ("The measures that are the
subject of this request are prohibited and actionable subsidies provided to US producers,
users and/or exporters of upland cotton, as well as legislation, regulations, statutory
instruments and amendments thereto providing such subsidies (including export credits),
grants, and any other assistance to the US producers, users and exporters of upland
cotton.").
134. See id. at 291.
135. See id. at 552, 584 ("Accordingly, we uphold the Panel's findings, in
paragraphs 7.1088, 7.1097-7.1098 and 8.1 (f) of the Panel Report, that Step 2 payments to
domestic users of United States upland cotton, under Section 1207(a) of the FSRI Act of
2002, are subsidies contingent on the use of domestic over imported goods that are
inconsistent with Articles 3. 1(b) and 3.2 of the SCM Agreement").
136. See id.
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subsidy program, but action by Congress was necessary to effectively
end it. 37 The U.S. position is to table the resolution of this issue until a
final agreement emerges from the Doha Round. 138 Many critics of the
Brazilian tactics have questioned whether Brazil brought this case simply
as a means to disrupt the Doha negotiations on agriculture. 139  The
strategy of pursuing litigation, rather than reaching solutions through
negotiation, might weaken multilateral trade. 140  Brazil, on the other
hand, would rather see the U.S. comply with the ruling of the Appellate
Body before the end of the Doha talks. 141 To date, Congress has not
acted on the Appellate Body ruling by eliminating the offending
subsidies, but the Appellate Body ruling mandates could be included in
the 2007 Farm Bill.
142
5. The Effect on the Success of the Doha Round
If the issues in the Cotton Case are not resolved between the U.S.
and Brazil, they could impede the success of a final Doha Round
agreement.1 43 Brazil has emerged as a leader among developing nations
and actively participated in the contentious agriculture negotiations
during the Doha Round. 144 Brazil instigated the 2003 walkout in Cancun
over the same agricultural issues. 14  Brazil may persuade other
developing nations to block any further Doha negotiations until the U.S.
implements the WTO Appellate Body ruling effectively.
IV. China's Role in WTO Negotiations: The Second Step to Achieving
Success in the Doha Round
As a rapidly developing trade nation, China has much to gain from
expanded international trade and much to lose if international trade
slows.14 6 China joined the WTO on December 11, 2001.147 Since that
137. See THOMPSON, supra note 10, at 12.
138. See WTO Issues Landmark Ruling Against U.S. Cotton Subsidies, WTO REP.,
Sept. 9, 2004 [hereinafter Landmark Ruling].
139. See Timothy Josling, IPC Roundtable Discussion: Cotton, Sugar and Wheat
Board Cases: What do They mean for Agricultural Negotiations?, Int'l Food & Agric.
Trade Pol'y Council, June 4, 2004, available at http://www.agritrade.org/
Brown%20Bag%20Series/josling.ppt.
140. See id.
141. See Landmark Ruling, supra note 139.
142. See THOMPSON, supra note 10, at 12.
143. See Becky L. Jacobs, Brazil's Agricultural Trade War: Success and Failure on
the Southern Route to Antarctica, 36 U. MIAMI INTER-AM L. REV. 167, 173-74 (2005)
(explaining that since the Cancun walkout, Brazil has taken an assertive approach to
agriculture reform and has refused to join any U.S. proposal).
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. See Eric A. Posner & John Yoo, Symposium: Legal Implications of a Rising
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time, China has become the U.S.'s fourth largest export market 148 and the
world's third largest trading nation.1 49  Furthermore, China's gross
domestic product has grown 500 percent since joining the WTO. 150
Approximately 377 million Chinese have been lifted above the poverty
line because of enhanced income from international trade.' The U.S.
Trade Representative visited China in August of 2006 and met with her
counterpart, the Minister of Commerce. 152  Her remarks encouraged
China to take an active role in the Doha discussions.153 She outlined the
U.S.'s primary fear that if the Doha talks failed, countries will resort to
litigation before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body rather than negotiate
trade practices. 154 The U.S. never prefers litigation because it is time
consuming and resource intensive. 155 If litigation results, due to failed
talks, China stands to lose significantly. 56  It is likely that many
countries will bring complaints against China before the Dispute
Settlement Body, which would be a very costly process for the
developing country.
157
A. Chinese Compliance with WTO Membership Guidelines
China's WTO membership was contingent on its commitment to
sweeping trade reforms, both internally and externally. 58 It developed
three general commitments: 1) bring Chinese trade policies in line with
WTO guidelines; 2) liberalize the Chinese market for goods and services;
and 3) introduce effective protection for intellectual property rights.159
China, 7 CHI. J. INT'L L. 1, 13 (2006).
147. See e.g., UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2006 REPORT TO CONGRESS
ON CHINA'S WTO COMPLIANCE 3 (2006) [hereinafter 2006 REPORT TO CONGRESS].
148. See Andrezj Zwaniecki, China Has Mixed Record on WTO Compliance, US.
Trade Agency Says, USINFO, Dec. 12, 2006, available at http://usinfo.state.gov/
xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2006&m=December&x=2006121217130
4SAikceinawz6.902713e-02.
149. See Susan Krause, China Has Major Stake in Global Trade Talks, US. Official
Says, USINFO, Aug. 29, 2006, available at http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.
html?p=washfile-english&y=2006&m=August&x=20060829182457ASesuarKO. 1810
572.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See Susan Schwab, United States Trade Representative, Remarks at AmCham
China - U.S. China Business Council Event (Aug. 29, 2006).
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. See Susan Schwab, United States Trade Representative, Remarks at AmCham
China - U.S. China Business Council Event (Aug. 29, 2006).
158. See 2006 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 148.
159. See The Dragon's Docile Role in WTO, FORBES, Mar. 9, 2006 [hereinafter
Dragon's Docile Role].
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Five years have passed since China's accession to the WTO and the
transitional period has ended in the eyes of the U.S. 160 The U.S. Trade
Representative, Susan Schwab, has said: "[W]ith five years of WTO
membership experience under its belt, we believe it is fair to expect
China to be implementing the letter and spirit of its WTO obligations in
full.' ' 161 China successfully implemented, repealed or revised thousands
of laws, regulations and policies after joining the WTO in order to
reform its economy into WTO free-trade compliance. 162 China's greatest
WTO compliance success rate has come from the service sector of its
economy.1 63  However, some of the country's industrial policies,
agricultural policies and intellectual property policies continue to be a
source of contention among other WTO Member States.1 64 The Chinese
policies in these areas are still distorting trade and, specifically, the U.S.
complained of excessive government involvement in the marketplace.
165
B. Current Chinese Attitudes Towards the Doha Talks
China has publicly stated its support for re-starting the Doha talks
and their speedy conclusion.1 66 The Chinese Commerce Minister, Bo
Xilai, stated that he was committed, along with the Indian Commerce
Minister, to getting the Doha Round back on track.167  The Ministers
said: "The outcome must expand trade opportunities for all; but it must
also achieve developmental objectives and safeguard crucial developing
country interests such as livelihood security which are the avowed
objectives of the Round."' 168
C. China's Passive Role in Influential International Trade Groupings
1. The G-20 and the G-33
China has become involved in the G-20 and G-33 negotiating blocs
in recent years. 169 The G-20 is a forum where key developing industrial
160. See Zwaniecki, supra note 149.
161. Id.
162. See 2006 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 148.
163. See Zwaniecki, supra note 149.
164. See 2006 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 148, at 3 & 61-67.
165. See Zwaniecki, supra note 149.
166. See India, China for "successful conclusion" of WTO Doha Round, ANI, Nov.
23, 2006.
167. See id.
168. Id.
169. See Krause, supra note 150; see also Mario Jales, G-33 Agricultural Tariff
Structures and Import Surges, 8 ICTSD 21 (2005), available at
http://www.agtradepolicy.org/output/resource/Jales BRIDGES9-8.pdf (explaining that
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countries can express and develop common financial policies.17 ° The G-
33 is a group of developing countries seeking protection for subsistence
farmers in WTO negotiations. 171 The G-33 is composed of forty-two
very diverse nations,172 ranging from the world's largest country, China,
to the most destitute, Haiti, to the developing world's most advanced
nation, South Korea. 173 Within both of those groups, China plays a very
passive role, and smaller nations with policies impeding Chinese
development play the leading roles. 174  China, as the world's most
populous country, could and should pursue more aggressive policies to
further its own interests within these groups. 175 Namely, the Chinese
representation should attempt to gain the trust of its trading partners and
should attempt to increase trade with other developing countries that
have potentially profitable future markets. 1
76
2. The G-6
China is not a member of the influential G-6 group within the WTO
structure. 177 The G-6 is made up of the six most powerful WTO nations
and their periodic informal meetings usually signify progress within the
WTO negotiating scheme. 178 Being a member of the group would allow
China to assume a role as a more powerful and influential WTO
negotiator. 1
79
the G-33 is composed of 42 developing countries from Africa, Asia, Latin America and
the Caribbean and these nations support Special Products and Special Safeguard
Mechanisms) (last visited June 3, 2007).
170. See Krause, supra note 150.
171. See id.
172. The G-33 includes: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Botswana,
China, Cote d'Ivoire, Congo, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada,
Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Korea,
Mauritius, Mongolia, Montserrat, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama,
the Philippines, Peru, Saint Kitts, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal,
Sri Lanka, Suriname, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, Venezuela,
Zambia and Zimbabwe.
173. See Jales, supra note 170.
174. See Krause, supra note 150.
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. See Dragon's Docile Role, supra note 160; see also Doha Round Suspended
Indefinitly After G-6 Talks Collapse, 10 ICTSD 27, July 26, 2006, available at
http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/06-07-26/storyl.htm (last visited June 3, 2007) (explaining
that the G-6 is comprised of the E.U., Brazil, Australia, U.S., India and Japan and are
described as the key six nations that have to bridge their differences for the Doha Round
to be successful).
178. See Dragon's Docile Role, supra note 160.
179. See id.
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3. Chinese Regional Leadership
Promisingly, China has assumed a leadership role in free-trade
agreements in the Asian region.' 80 China, Japan and South Korea have
all pursued aggressive bilateral trade agreements with other smaller
Asian countries. 18  The effect of these individual agreements will be
greater trade distortion in the region because each nation is pursuing its
own individual interests in each agreement. 82 The only way to avoid
such distortion is for the Asian region to establish a multi-lateral regional
trade agreement, or for Asia to accept the broader WTO multilateral
trading system.
83
D. Congress's Reaction to China's Passive Role
If the Doha Round talks fail, China could resort to its protectionist
policies of the past. 84 The U.S. Trade Representative has cited various
bills before Congress that propose a "get tough" approach to dealing with
China and its entry into the global trading regime. 185 The U.S. Trade
Representative believes that if China acts responsibly and takes an active
role in encouraging Doha talks, the concerns expressed by Congress will
be allayed.
186
1. House Resolution 3283: One Reaction to China's Trade
Policies
House Resolution 3283, entitled the "United States Trade Rights
Enforcement Act" 87 and authored by Representative Phil English of
188.18Pennsylvania, is one of the "get-tough" bills directed toward China. 89
This bill calls into question the policies of non-market economy nations,
such as China.190 Through this bill, the House of Representatives has
expressed a belief that non-market economies' 9' are hurting American
180. See id.
181. See id.
182. See id.
183. See Dragon's Docile Role, supra note 160.
184. See Krause, supra note 150.
185. See id.
186. See id.
187. United States Trade Rights Enforcement Act, H.R. 3283, 109th Cong. § 1 (2005)
("This Act may be cited as the 'United States Trade Rights Enforcement Act."').
188. See United States House of Representatives, US. Congressman English, U.S.
H.R., http://www.house.gov/english/biography.shtml (last visited June 3, 2007).
189. See H.R. 3283 § 2(11).
190. See id.
191. See Deardorfis Glossary of International Economics, International Economics
Glossary, available at http://www-personal.umich.edu/-alandear/glossary/n.html (last
visited June 3, 2007) (stating that a non-market economy is defined as, "A country in
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producers because these economic systems subsidize the products they
export to the U.S. 92 The Resolution also encourages the U.S. Trade
Representative to aggressively negotiate with non-market economies
about their trade practices and, if necessary, pursue dispute settlement
proceedings against these unfair trade practices in every available
forum.' 
9 3
The bill specifically refers to China because of the exploding trade
relationship the U.S. has with it, and, the significant impact this trade
relationship has on the U.S.'s economy. 194 It encourages the U.S. Trade
Representative to pay particular attention and focus resources on the
U.S.-China trade relationship. 95  The bill requires the U.S. Trade
Representative to request a detailed accounting of all of the subsidies
China pays to its citizens in the agriculture market to ensure complete
WTO compliance. 196
Also, the bill calls into question China's refusal to join the
Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) within the WTO. 197 The
GPA is comprised of the U.S., the E.U. Member States, and others, such
as Hong Kong, Israel, Japan and South Korea. When China joined the
WTO in 2001, it committed to commence negotiations to join the GPA
in a timely manner. 98 As of the creation of this bill, China had yet to
begin the negotiation process.' 99 The U.S. is concerned about China's
delay in beginning this process.200 This concern was exacerbated by
Chinese behavior after it joined the WTO by passing a law for the
purposes of government procurement of goods and services, in which
China showed a strong preference for domestic products and services.20 '
This preference for domestic products and services most strongly affects
the computer software market within the U.S. because American
manufacturers are at a strong disadvantage marketing their products to
the large buying power of the Chinese government.20 2 This is extremely
troublesome because U.S. software manufacturers have made substantial
commitments to developing the software industry in China and now
which most major economic decisions are imposed by government and by central
planning rather than by free use of markets").
192. See H.R. 3283 § 2(1).
193. See id. at § 2(10).
194. See id. at § 2(1l).
195. See id.
196. See id. at § 5(e).
197. See H.R. 3283 § 9(a)(2).
198. See id. at § 9(a)(6).
199. See id. at § 9(a)(7).
200. See id.
201. See id. at § 9(a)(9).
202. See H.R. 3283 § 9(a)(13).
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
cannot compete in this same market.2 °3 The U.S. fears that this policy on
computer software, if it is allowed to continue unchallenged within the
WTO, will result in broader policies within China relating to all goods
and services across the board, including agriculture. 20 4  This, in turn,
could lead to other developing countries following China's lead, and
enacting similar policies, which could completely distort free trade on a
global scale.20 5 The bill proposes to make the U.S. the lead player in
ensuring China's honest and eager participation in the WTO. If this is
not done, China will continue its unfair protectionist policies and will
continue to go unchecked by the WTO.2 °6
2. Senate Bill 2317: Another Attempt to Influence China's Trade
Policies
Senate bill 2317 was an attempt by three senators (Max Baucus of
Montana,20 7 Debbie Stabenow of Michigan,20 8 and Orrin Hatch of
Utah209) to attack the trade issues with China with their "Trade
Competitiveness Act of 2006.,,21" The bill requires the U.S. Trade
Representative to encourage foreign nations' policies that in the future
will increase economic growth within the U.S. 211  The U.S. Trade
Representative should identify those foreign nations' policies as "foreign
country trade priorities. 21 2  Although the House Resolution aims to
address Chinese actions directly, the Senate bill focuses on Asia's use of
currency manipulation under the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to
gain a trade advantage.21 3 The policies of Asian central banks are
keeping Asian currencies from competing against the dollar in an open
market.214 Because the U.S. is the largest shareholder in the IMF (and
the most powerful within the WTO), the U.S. has the most clout in
persuading the IMF to disallow this currency distortion.215
203. See id. at § 9(a)(14).
204. See id. at § 9(a)(23).
205. See id. at § 9(a)(24).
206. See id. at § 9(b)(1-5).
207. See United States Senate, Max Baucus: Senator from Montana, U.S. S.,
available at http://baucus.senate.gov/about/index.cfm (last visited June 3, 2007).
208. See United States Senate, U.S. Senator Debbie Stabenow-Michigan, U.S. S.,
available at http://stabenow.senate.gov/ (last visited June 3, 2007).
209. See United States Senate, US. Senator Orrin Hatch, U.S. S., available at
http://hatch.senate.gov/ (last visited June 3, 2007).
210. See Trade Competitiveness Act of 2006, S. 2317, 109"' Cong. § 1 (2006).
211. Seeid. at § 311(a)(2).
212. Id.
213. Compare id. at § 5 (focusing on Asian currency manipulation), with H.R. 3283
§ 2(11) (addressing Chinese actions specifically).
214. See id. at § 5(6).
215. See S. 2317 § 5(9).
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3. Congressional Fears Regarding the U.S.-China Relationship:
Are they Well-Founded?
Congress is concerned about the enormous growth the Chinese
economy faces in the near future, and the corresponding threat to the
powerful status of the U.S. Much of this is evidenced by the current U.S.
trade deficit with China, totaling $201.6 billion in 2005.216 The deficit
grew by $40 billion between 2004 and 2005.217 The WTO will play a
unique role in the negotiation of a relationship between the U.S. and
China in the future.2t 8 A forum provision for the U.S. and China to
negotiate up-and-coming trade issues reduces chances of a super-power
rivalry down the road.219  Both nations have much to gain from
successful international trade with each other, and with others around the
world 2 °
With China growing at a rapid pace, it is understandable that
Congress would be concerned about China threatening the U.S.'s strong
ties to other countries in the Asian region. 22' The U.S. has built strong
trade relationships with Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, all neighbors of
China.22  These relationships could be damaged or undermined by
growing Chinese power in the region.223 The only solution to this
possible regional trade competition is to encourage a broad, multilateral
solution under the framework of the WTO through the completion of the
Doha Round.
V. Election 2006: Changes in Washington-No Change for the Doha
Round
New Democratic majorities in the House and Senate in January
2007 brings questions about what the future of Doha negotiations might
hold. U.S. Trade Representative Susan Schwab spoke to these concerns
224following the election. At a conference organized by the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, Schwab said that the Administration would not
216. UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2006 TRADE REPORT WITH CHINA 1
(2006).
217. Id.
218. See Posner & Yoo, supra note 147.
219. See id.
220. See id.
221. See id. at 14.
222. See id.
223. See Eric A. Posner & John Yoo, Symposium: Legal Implications of a Rising
China, 7 CHI. J. INT'L L. 1, 14 (2006).
224. See Andrezj Zwaniecki, Incoming U.S. Congress Seen Not Changing Trade
Agenda, USINFO, Nov. 29, 2006, available at http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/
display.html?p-washfile-english&y=2006&m=November&x=20061129142632S
Aikceinawz0.4388086.
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be changing its Doha policy now that leadership in Congress has
changed. 225 The only change that will result is more dialogue between
trade representatives and Congress, as the Democratic leadership is more
concerned about strong labor and environmental standards, both in the
U.S. and abroad.226 Schwab also cited resuming Doha talks as the top
priority trade issue for the Bush Administration.227 It is important for the
U.S. to speak with one voice when confronting Doha negotiations and
when making commitments to other WTO Member States.228 As
evidenced in the past, Congress and the Administration have differed in
the commitments they make to fellow WTO members. This has only
lead to conflict and additional stalemates in the talks. The elections have
not weakened the U.S.'s commitment to a successful conclusion to the
Doha talks because both political parties are encouraging such an
outcome.229
VI. Conclusion: The Solution to Successfully Negotiating a Doha
Agreement
A. Analysis of Two Possible Paths for Showing Commitment to
Successful Doha Negotiations
The International Food and Agricultural Trade Policy Council
predicts that the 2007 Farm Bill will look much like the 2002 Farm Bill,
which signals danger for the resumption of Doha negotiations.23° If the
U.S. passes a Farm Bill similar to the one that caused international
outrage in 2002, it will be handing China a disincentive to
enthusiastically pursue resuming the Doha talks. China needs to see the
U.S. take a serious step forward in committing to the Doha Round before
it can be expected to take its own leadership role in pushing the talks
forward.
Another alternative for the U.S. would be for Congress to wait on
the passage of a 2007 Farm Bill until after negotiations conclude. If
Congress does this, and subsequently incorporates the final Doha Round
agreement on agriculture into the 2007 Farm Bill, it will show
commitment to the principles negotiated in Doha. Under this solution,
China can then be encouraged to take a more active role in encouraging
other developing countries to adhere to Doha's mandates. Other
225. See id.
226. See id.
227. See id.
228. See id.
229. See Zwaniecki, supra note 225.
230. See THOMPSON, supra note 10, at 15.
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countries will then see that the negotiations they participated in will have
an impact on the internal agricultural policies of the U.S.
American farmers are less than enthusiastic about the resolution of
countries' differences in the Doha negotiations. They should be
concerned about the outcome of the final version of the 2007 Farm Bill
and the resolution of the Doha Round. If the new farm bill maintains the
status quo regarding subsidies to American farmers, this will be seen as a
minimalist effort in getting the Doha Round back on track.231  This
minimalist attitude will hurt the U.S. in the long term.232 Currently,
seventy-three percent of all U.S. exports are sent to countries other than
Canada and E.U. nations, the main allies of the U.S. within the Doha
negotiation framework.233 Developing countries in Asia and Latin
America are buying the majority of U.S. exports.2 34 In 2000, Asian states
purchased forty-three percent of all U.S. farm exports235 and Latin
American states purchased twenty-two percent.236 These countries are
projected to be the future growth market for American farmers because
they are projected to add billions of people to the world's population in
the first half of the 21 st century.2 37
However, there is one important caveat in dealing with these
developing nations. These nations must have the purchasing power to
continue to buy American agricultural products.238 Increased levels of
international trade are the most effective way to keep this purchasing
power available. 239 The Doha Round and its successful completion will
ensure that international trade is encouraged, and will ensure that
American farmers continue to have places to sell their products around
the world.
Furthermore, China needs to take a more active role within the
Doha negotiating framework. China needs to reflect its size and power
in the process of getting the Doha negotiations back on track. The U.S.
has made attempts to enhance dialogue with China through bilateral trade
discussions, in an attempt to bring China back into the global trading
regime.240 For instance, in April 2006, the U.S. and China successfully
negotiated the re-opening of Chinese markets to American beef 2 4 1
231. See id. at 16.
232. See id.
233. See id.
234. See id.
235. THOMPSON, supra note 10, at 16. This does not need a "hereinafter," just used
the author's last name and a supra referring back to note 10.
236. Id.
237. See id. at 16-17.
238. See id. at 17.
239. See id.
240. See Schwab, supra note 153.
241. See id.
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China also needs to take its commensurate role in the G-20 and G-33
trading blocks because, currently, less-powerful nations with interests
adverse to those of China are driving the positions of these two trading
blocks.242
As has been suggested, perhaps the single greatest thing China can
do to encourage the resumption of the Doha Round and promote
increased international trade is to lead by strong example.243 China also
needs to assure its fellow developing countries that its markets will
remain open to their products.244 The maintenance of open South-South
trade245 will only allow China's economy to grow in the future.246
For the same reasons the U.S. needs to encourage trade with
developing nations, these nations are the markets for future growth.247
The successful completion of the Doha Round is the largest insurance
policy for sustaining growth in international trade for the future. Both
the U.S., through the 2007 Farm Bill, and China, through more active
participation in resuming the talks, should advocate for a speedy and
final Doha agreement between all WTO Member States to ensure
sustainable levels of international trade in the future.
242. See id.
243. See id.
244. See id.
245. See U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev. [UNCTAD], A South-South Survival Strategy:
The Potential for Trade Among Developing Countries, Abstract, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/ITCD/TAB/34 (2006) (explaining that South-South trade is defined as trade
between developing nations).
246. See id.
247. See Schwab, supra note 153.
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